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Abstract: This paper examines the organisational hierarchies and decision making processes of two Chinese multina-
tional enterprises operating in Vietnam—China Luoyang Floating Glass Corp. (CLFG) and China TCL Holdings Co. 
Ltd. (TCL). For this study, research data were obtained from in-depth interviews of more than 20 government officials 
in P. R. China and Vietnam, and managers and staff of those two enterprises. Results indicate that the organisational 
structures of the two enterprises are still vertical but complex, although moderate changes made to them post the na-
tionwide economic reform of China. Consequently, decision making process follows a “top-down” model, sometimes, 
with insufficient grassroots information. Findings are discussed in the light of political, social and cultural milieu, and 
implications are drawn for the management of Chinese multinational enterprises operating in overseas markets. Both 
CLFG and China TCL are structured on task specialisations. However, departmentalisation in TCL’s overseas division 
in head office is not only based on products, but is also based on geographical regions of markets. The organisational 
structure of TCL in Vietnam is less complex than the international division, but it is more centralised. Decision making 
at TCL combines more traditional Chinese business philosophy with modern western organisational characteristics. 
TCL has a strong western influence on its management style. However, some traditional characteristics such as “hero” 
leadership influence and political influence are involved with decision making at TCL. Amongst others, the transitional 
economy, social culture, poor management system and political sensitivity have been major elements influencing deci-
sion making. In the case of CLFG, some decisions have been made before proper information has been gathered and 
analysed. 
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making 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development’s (UNCTAD) report, as an emerging 
market, China has made the list of the expected top five 
countries worldwide for the first time in terms of geo-
graphical coverage (2004–2005), replacing Japan. At a 
global level, China’s offshore investment is still small, 
but significant growth potential clearly exists. With 
CHINALCO intending to merge with Rio Tinto, Haier 
buying Maytag, TCL buying Thompson, Lenovo buying 
IBM’s laptop business, and CNOOP’s attempted merger 
with Unocol, Chinese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
have also become a growing provider of significant FDI 
to the rest of the world. 
China’s economic reform that started from 1979 has 
had great impact on the operational environment and 
management system of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). With the openning-up policy in place in the late 
1970s, many large SOEs have been trying to expand 
their business in the overseas markets. By the end of 
2007, more than 7000 domestic Chinese investment en-
tities have established nearly 10,000 overseas direct in-
vested enterprises across 173 countries worldwide with 
total accumulated value reached to US$117.91×109 
(MOFCOM, NBSC, SAFEC, 2008).  In the case of 
Vietnam, since the normalisation of relations between 
China and Vietnam in the early 1990s, bilateral eco-
nomic, trade and political ties have developed rapidly. 
By exploring investment opportunities in a neighbouring 
market, these two transitional economies became im-
portant trading partners. The two governments have also 
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signed numerous agreements for investment protection 
since the normalisation of relations. According to statis-
tical data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOC), by the end of 2007, excluding the financial 
sector, China had invested in 94 projects in Vietnam, 
with accumulated volume totalling US$396.99×106 
(MOFCOM, NBSC, SAFEC, 2008).  .  
Academics such as Liu (2004), Luo (2002), Wang 
(2002), Taylor (2002), Fu (2000), Cai (1999) and Buck-
ley (1998) have touched on the issue of Chinese MNEs, 
but only generally addressed the motivations of, and 
basic mechanism for, Chinese MNEs to invest in other 
countries, particularly in advanced economies, such as 
Australia, Canada, USA and Hong Kong SAR. Insuffi-
cient research has been directed to Chinese investment 
in developing countries such as Vietnam. This paper 
attempts to fill the gap in this line of research by exam-
ining two Chinese MNEs in Vietnam with particular 
respect to organisational hierarchies and their influence 
on decision making processes. Findings from this study 
are expected to enhance our understanding of Chinese 
MNEs operating in the overseas markets and suggest 
policy implications.  
 
2 Method 
 
A qualitative research method was considered more ap-
propriate for this study as it allowed the participants to 
offer their responses to politically sensitive and contro-
versial issues using their own words and terminology. It 
also provided a more in-depth understanding of the 
processes of decision making. Questions such as “How 
did the organisational structure form”; “Who is making 
decisions within the organisation”; and “How have these 
decisions been made” were asked in the interviews. The 
three research approaches employed for this 
study—case study, secondary data review and official 
statistic analysis, and semi-structured interview tech-
nique of collecting information will be explained. 
Among the numerous Chinese MNEs operating in Viet-
namese markets, China Luoyang Floating Glass Corp. 
(CLFG) and China TCL Holdings Co. Ltd. (TCL) were 
selected as cases for this study. Both companies are 
large state-owned manufacturing enterprises in China. 
CLFG, established in 1956, is the largest comprehensive 
glass manufacturer in China and the birthplace of 
“Luoyang Float Process”—one of three float processes 
in the world. TCL is a comprehensive large-scale 
state-owned enterprise. The semi-structured in-depth 
interview is particularly suitable for the managers from 
China and Vietnam in terms of cultural backgrounds. 
From a cultural perspective, managers from China and 
Vietnam try to avoid the written communication, par-
ticularly which is regarded as politically sensitive, criti-
cal and controversial issues. Face to face communica-
tion could break down those concerns and barriers. It 
allows the participants to offer their responses to politi-
cally sensitive and controversial issues using their own 
words and terminology. Sometimes, a simple nod or 
facial expression can illustrate his/her attitude towards a 
particular issue. A large set of secondary data was re-
viewed. Even though a few indirect studies have been 
conducted on Chinese FDI in Vietnam, some relevant 
existing statistics, relevant documents and regulations 
are available for study. The World Economy and Politics 
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 
Beijing, Chinese Academy of International Trade and 
Economic Cooperation in Beijing and Vietnam Acad-
emy of Social Science, Hochiminh City branch all 
proved useful sources to seek clarity and information. 
The researchers in these institutes provide additional 
documentation and regulations relevant to this study, 
such as: China Statistical Yearbook (1993–2003) (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China, 1993–2003), Statis-
tical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct In-
vestment (MOFCOM, NBSC, SAFEC, 2004–2007; 
2008), World Investment Report (1993–2008) (United 
Nation Conference on Trade and Development, 
1993–2008), Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (The Editorial Board of the Alma-
nac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
1993–2003), annual reports of TCL and CLFG compa-
nies, and some government documents involving 
China’s policies for foreign trades, instruction of out-
ward FDI, Vietnam inward FDI law etc. 
There are number of data sources that were in Chi-
nese and Vietnamese, the author translated most of 
documents into English.  
The data collected for the two cases involved three 
months in China and three months in Vietnam. During 
the fieldtrip, approximately 15 managers from head of-
fice and subsidiaries, as well as government officials 
who have been involved with Chinese outward FDI in 
Vietnam were interviewed. Each interview usually took 
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3 to 4 hours of formal interviewing time and many hours 
at the banquet table. Four key interviewees were inter-
viewed twice, allowing deeper conversations to take 
place. Interviews were also conducted with academics 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing 
and the Vietnam Academy of Social Science in Ho-
chiminh City and government officials from the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (cur-
rently Ministry of Commerce) in China and the Chinese 
consulate business section in Vietnam. Chinese and 
Vietnamese academics, officials were introduced 
through existing networks.  
During the data collection period, the grounded theory 
technique was applied. Content analysis was linked with 
the grounded theory approach to interpret the data col-
lected during and after each field trip. If the grounded 
theory technique raised an issue, content analysis was 
applied to further examine the nature of the issue in 
question. Furthermore, an analytic comparison technique 
was also used to find out similarities (Method of 
Agreement) and differences (Method of Difference) 
between the two enterprises. From the analysis, collec-
tive and individual motives and mechanisms of the two 
Chinese MNEs international value added activities in 
Vietnam were identified and analysed. 
 
3 Results and Discussion 
 
3.1 Organisation structures of China TCL and 
CLFG 
The structural organisation of Chinese MNEs is one of 
the important keys to understand the operation mecha-
nisms guiding Chinese MNEs investment in Vietnam. 
The organisational structure reflects the ownership, 
corporate strategy, and the coordination and control of 
the enterprises. Like most Chinese MNEs, both the 
overseas business division of TCL and overseas division 
of CLFG are vertically structured with different depart-
ments operating at different levels of the organisational 
hierarchy.  
Within the corporation structure, as many interview-
ees pointed out, TCL’s Overseas Business Division is 
one of the most important divisions. This is another in-
dication of TCL’s international expansion strategy. The 
vice presidents in each division take specific responsi-
bility. The CEO of the division oversees the overall 
agenda and some key tasks. The departmentalisation of 
divisions is not only based on the products, but also on 
geographical regions such as the European Union, North 
America, and Southeast Asia.  
Such organisational structure indicates that each of 
the functions of China TCL was standardised. The func-
tions were clearly divided between divisions. The or-
ganisational structure of TCL Vietnam was also central-
ised to facilitate commands to pass from top to bottom 
and the results were easily monitored by top manage-
ment (Fig. 1). One of the reasons for this was that TCL 
Vietnam is still “young” and the managers and division 
chiefs need to gain more trust in order to get more 
power. 
CLFG’s structure was slightly different from TCL’s. 
There were three ownership groups of constituent com-
panies in CLFG’s current structure. The first group of 
constituent companies consisted of those that were 
wholly owned by CLFG. The wholly owned subsidiaries 
were mainly servicing companies for CLFG. They pro-
vided professional services such as financial services or 
hospitality services to CLFG and its subsidiaries. The 
second group of constituent companies were those ma-
jority owned by CLFG. CLFG Vietnam and the core 
business of CLFG, publicly listed Luoyang Glass Com-
pany Limited, were in this group. The majority of those 
partially owned subsidiaries were mainly manufacturing 
businesses. They were involved in different aspects of 
the industry. The last group of constituent companies 
were partially owned by CLFG, but the share it owned 
was not large enough to control the constituent compa-
nies. The subsidiaries in this group were mainly distri-
bution companies or in related industries. The current 
organisational structure of CLFG was highly complex 
(Fig. 2). 
Sino-Vietnam Longjiang Glass Mirror Company 
Limited is CLFG’s subsidiary in Vietnam. As a joint 
venture in Vietnam, Sino-Vietnam Longjiang Glass 
Mirror Company Limited is majority owned by CLFG. 
CLFG head office directly managed the Vietnamese 
subsidiary, and a centralised structure existed between 
head office and the subsidiary. However, the ownership 
of the subsidiary was undergoing change during the time 
of this study. Due to a non-profitable result in the Viet-
namese market, CLFG was negotiating with a Vietnam-
ese partner to try to sell its ownership to the Vietnamese 
counterpart. The Vietnam subsidiary had a centralised, 
less complex organisational structure, with Vietnamese
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Fig. 1 TCL Overseas Business Division structure in 2003①
 
and Chinese managers sharing positions. The director of 
the board was the decision maker. The General Manager 
was from China, as were the manufacturing, technology 
and finance managers. The marketing and sales manager 
and other managers were from Vietnam. The manufac-
turing sector was departmentalised by products while 
the marketing and sales sector was departmentalised by 
geographical location (south, north and central).  
The change of the ownership of China TCL and 
CLFG during the economic transition had a strong im-
pact on the organisational structures. With rapid expan-
sion of operation reflected by an increase in assets from 
5000 yuan (RMB) at the beginning to today’s multibil-
lion-dollar revenue, TCL has had to change its organisa-
                       
① Source: China TCL Holdings Co. Ltd company profile booklet (China) 
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Fig. 2 CLFG Organisational Structure①
 
tional structure frequently during the last three decades. 
The current organisational structure of TCL is complex. 
Wen and Qiu (2003) described TCL’s organisational 
structure change as turning from a ‘flexible goat to a slow 
giant elephant’. In contrast, CLFG has gradually trans-
ferred from a centrally planned SOE to a 
mixed-ownership business group. The current organisa-
tional structure of CLFG is based on its core busi-
ness—CLFG which has been listed on the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai stock exchanges. It was also complex and 
some functions overlap.  
 
3.2 Decision making in TCL and CLFG 
The decision making processes within China TCL and 
CLFG are quite similar to those of the West, including 
defining the problem, collecting and analysing informa-
tion, choosing alternatives, implementing actions and 
monitoring decisions. The relationship between head of-
fice and subsidiary in CLFG is seen as a 
“mother-daughter” relationship. The export department at 
CLFG is in charge of its Vietnamese subsidiary. This de-
partment is directly controlled by the President. The ex-
port department has limited functions, however, impor-
tant initiatives and decisions are usually made at a higher 
level of management. The department is mainly involved 
in daily administrative work. Because CLFG in Vietnam 
is a joint venture, final decisions have to be agreed on by 
both parties. This involves extensive negotiations.  
In general, decision making in CLFG could be cate-
gorised as both “top down” and “bottom up”. The “top 
down” refers to top authority pushing down decisions. 
As CLFG is in transition, and due to its ownership his-
tory, there are still planned economy ways of thinking in 
existence in CLFG. These decisions are mainly gener-
ated by the government policy. Because most of these 
decisions are made without research, sometimes it is 
difficult for lower levels to accept them. The “bottom 
up” decision emerges mainly from the lower level of 
CLFG. Many decisions have to be made at the bottom 
levels due to rapid changes in market demand and many 
issues affecting the bottom levels of the organisation 
must be finalised quickly. After such decisions are made,
                       
① Source: China Luoyang Float Glass Group Company Limited profile book 
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the top management normally tends to issue new poli-
cies to address the issues raised by the local office.  
This decision making process at CLFG is similar to 
those observed in many western organisations, however, 
there are discrete differences in each step at CLFG. At 
the problem definition stage, CLFG usually has the 
“bottom up” style of decision making. On most occa-
sions senior management is forced to deal with prob-
lems that have eventuated. This happens to senior man-
agement both in Vietnam and at the Head Office (in 
China?). CLFG managers were granted more rights to 
make decision on the direction of the enterprise. How-
ever, there are still other affairs, such as political issues, 
personnel issues (even occasionally sorting out conflicts 
between husbands and wives within enterprises) and 
daily routine issues that require the involvement of sen-
ior managers.  
Lack of skills and knowledge within the management 
of modern organisations is another explanation for the 
“bottom up” style. Collection and analysis of informa-
tion is crucial for CLFG operations. CLFG managers 
view the relevant market information and new national 
policies as extremely critical information for the enter-
prise. This was mentioned by a number of senior man-
agers of CLFG during the interviews. For example, the 
“go outside” policy was one of the main motivations for 
the decision to invest in Vietnam. Lack of reliable in-
formation, particularly market information, deficient 
knowledge and skill are common problems that CLFG is 
facing. Information presented here was collected from 
the delegates’ personal experience and business sen-
se—a survey questionnaire was not conducted.  
Another characteristic of decision making at CLFG is 
that sometimes decision-makers do not completely rely 
on, or entirely trust, the collected information. For ex-
ample, Chinese managers mentioned that they do not 
trust the interviews conducted by their marketing man-
agers because both Chinese and Vietnamese managers 
tend to provide only positive stories. They do not be-
lieve that information collected by marketing managers 
is reliable for decision making due to traditional phi-
losophies of saving face and modesty.  
Monitoring and controlling the result is the step 
which has too often been ignored by some managers. 
Because mangers do not realise the importance of 
monitoring results, there are no effective and efficient 
systems in place at CLFG to support this step in the de-
cision making process. Too often decision-makers at 
CLFG have already formed their decisions before 
proper information is gathered and analyzed. Firstly, 
decision-makers do not understand the whole decision 
making process. Secondly, decision-makers have their 
own interests rather than the organisational interests in 
mind.  
All decisions made by CLFG are centralised. CLFG 
Vietnam is required to contact the head office on a daily 
basis. CLFG management assumes that the head office 
tightly control the Vietnamese subsidiaries. However, 
due to a lack of management systems in fields such as 
financial control and supply chain analysis, head office 
does not fully understand what is going on in its Viet-
namese subsidiaries. The Chinese managers in Vietnam 
often have their own interests at heart. They have been 
known to use business capital to conduct their own 
business, thereby delaying payment to head office. 
Vietnamese managers have also tried to set up their own 
businesses using the knowledge they have gained at 
CLFG Vietnam in direct competition with CLFG Viet-
nam. The decisions in CLFG are frequently complex 
and contradictory to the central command.  
Founded in the early 1980s, TCL has been less influ-
enced by the central-planning system. The decision 
making process of TCL has unique characteristics com-
bining modern and traditional Chinese private organisa-
tional characteristics. The senior managers of TCL have 
complete decision making authority. Those authorities 
are protected by the Law of Enterprise, which was en-
acted in 1984.  
Like CLFG, TCL head office and its Vietnamese sub-
sidiary can also be described as a “mother-daughter” 
relationship. The international business division at TCL 
is in charge of their Vietnamese subsidiaries. This divi-
sion is under the direct control of the President. The in-
ternational business division has limited functions, as 
the important initiatives and decisions are usually made 
at a higher level of management. This division is mainly 
involved in daily administrative work.  
Traditional Chinese family business and modern or-
ganisational style characteristics are also reflected in its 
leadership. The strong leadership in TCL is definitely 
one of its main distinguishing characteristics. Senior 
managers, including the chairman, have final decision 
making authority in manufacturing administration, hu-
man resources management, financial management and 
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other important fields of the enterprise. In general, the 
decision making in TCL could be categorised as a com-
bination of both “top down” and “bottom up”. The 
aforementioned Chinese saying regarding such deci-
sions, “Where there is a policy from above, there will be 
a counter tactic from below” does not appear to exist at 
TCL.  Most decisions are made based on research and 
feasibility studies and are implemented thoroughly 
without resistance. There also exist channels for “bot-
tom up” decisions. The lower level employees are able 
to express their opinions, which are communicated to 
the final decision makers. But there is no guarantee that 
decision makers will accept all recommendations as the 
leadership of TCL is relatively strong. If we regard TCL 
as a Chinese family, the chairman would be the father 
figure. TCL’s successful expansion has been due to the 
strength of its leader. Every success story of TCL is at-
tributed to the chairman’s leadership, and with little 
criticism, which means that final and absolute decision 
making power rests with him. Nolan (1996) pointed out 
that because most Chinese do not believe in a god like 
most westerners do, Chinese usually seek heroes among 
their leaders. 
The problem defining step in TCL is usually in the 
“top down” style. However, before the decision has been 
made, the senior management will consult with relevant 
groups and do extensive research to assist the decision.  
The step of information collection and analysis is crucial 
for TCL. For example, the “go outside” policy as one of 
the primary considerations behind the decision to invest 
in Vietnam was commonly quoted. TCL has its own in-
formation collecting system. The system is similar to 
those of most modern international organisations. Dif-
ferent teams are in charge of different products and 
functions. The information is then collected for the 
managing board. The board will then engage in exten-
sive discussion, drawing on all the information gathered. 
Different members also draw on their own experience in 
such discussion. The analysing process is mainly con-
cerned with debating the possibilities and different al-
ternative scenarios.  
Decision makers at TCL usually collect the feedbacks 
from different aspects until the objectives have been 
achieved. For example, after TCL Vietnam made a profit 
in Vietnam a year after initial investment, TCL con-
ducted another round of research in Vietnam. As said by 
a senior manager, this research is vital because it is not 
only for evaluation of the results of this particular in-
vestment but also in preparing for moves into other 
markets such as Russia, India and France. This method 
is a more “bottom up” style. Basically TCL’s “top 
down” relies on “bottom up”. The effective and efficient 
monitoring systems in place at TCL have derived from 
successful experiences in the home country.  
Most of the decisions made at TCL are centralised 
and strategic decisions. The strong leadership and rela-
tively well-established monitoring systems have guided 
these decisions. The General Manager of TCL Vietnam 
said that they could only make decisions on administra-
tive issues. All other issues have to be reported to head 
office and decided at a higher level of management. The 
centralised systems at TCL also result in more complex 
and less flexible decisions. The system is very formal in 
nature. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
This paper has shown the organisational structures and 
decision making processes of two multinational compa-
nies—China TCL and CLFG. Both of them are struc-
tured on task specialisations. However, departmentalisa-
tion in TCL’s overseas division in head office is not only 
based on products, but is also based on geographical 
regions of markets. The organisational structure of TCL 
in Vietnam is less complex than the international divi-
sion, but it is more centralised. After restructuring the 
ownership of CLFG, the functions of each enterprise in 
the group became clear and power and authorities were 
also decentralised. The CLFG head office directly man-
ages the Vietnam subsidiary. CLFG in Vietnam is less 
formalised than head office, as some functions of Chi-
nese and Vietnamese General Managers overlap. 
Decision making steps at TCL and CLFG are similar 
to western organisations in that they define problems, 
collect and analyse information, formulate alternative 
scenarios, choose scenarios and implement actions, and 
monitor results. Decision making at TCL combines 
more traditional Chinese business philosophy with 
modern organisational characteristics. Located in 
Guangdong Province, the pioneering region for eco-
nomic reform in China, TCL has a strong western influ-
ence in its management style. However, there are some 
traditional characteristics such as “hero” leadership in-
fluence and political influence that are involved with 
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decision making at TCL. Amongst others, the transi-
tional economy, social culture, poor management system 
and political sensitivity have been major elements in-
fluencing decision making. China claims that its econ-
omy is a socialist-market economy with Chinese char-
acteristics. The personality of the leader has been a 
strong influence on decision making at TCL, while in 
the case of CLFG, some decisions have been made be-
fore proper information has been gathered and analysed.  
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